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-often concluding that both commit a compositional fallacy. But Searle himself has faulted the Leibniz story on precisely these grounds (Searle 1983 , pp. 267f.). Moreover, while both stories may be fallacious, they are not alike. Leibniz assumed that his machine could think and perceive, apparently concluding that its working could not be purely mechanical, whereas Searle argues from the purely mechanical, but non-biological, character of the running program to its inability to exhibit understanding: Thus, one man's modus tollens becomes another's modus ponens.
Cole offers several arguments against Searle, including: (a) that "the machine simulation of a human" is not analogous to "the human simulation of the machine," and (b) that the "simulation of a machine" might "produce understanding" (Cole 1984 , pp. 431-32).
The first of these claims is weak, but sheds some interesting light on the nature of computer programs and on the nature of understanding. The second is much stronger. But both miss what I shall argue are more serious objections to Searle.
Humans and Machines. Let us consider, first, the alleged disanalogy between humans and machines; namely, that the human in the room is following rules, but a machine does not: a machine would only "act in accord with rules" (Cole 1984, p. 438). But suppose (as Hofstadter
has suggested) that the human completely internalizes (or "compiles") the rules, so that they are not being (consciously and slowly) followed, but merely acted in accord with (at great speed). Even so, Searle could still respond that the human still doesn't understand Chinese in the way that he understands English, because of a missing semantic component-the lack of correlation between the symbols and the world. That is, Searle could admit that the human might have "syntactic understanding" but not "semantic understanding." (I shall return to these notions later.) This response on Searle's part-which needs to be countered more carefully-shows that the alleged disanalogy is not of central importance.
To support his claim of disanalogy, Cole also says that "computer programs are not a series of rules, instructions or commands" (Cole 1984 Clearly, such steps can be generalized and made more precise, providing an algorithm for solving linear equations in one unknown. But notice that each step is purely syntactic: symbol manipulation in its purest sense. I gained a great deal of skill in performing these manipulations, and my teachers, fellow students, and I all agreed that I "understood" how to solve such equations. I had syntactic understanding.
Later that year, I watched an educational-television program whose subject was solving equations. The technique presented was, to me, radically different and quite eye-opening. To solve equation (1) One way to make a case for this is to view a mental phenomenon, such as thinking, as something abstract that can be implemented in two different media; say in a human brain and in a computer. The computer implementation of thinking can be said to be a simulation of the human implementation of thinking, and the two kinds of thinkings can be distinguished by differences between the implementing media, yet they are both species of thinking. This is cute, but without any further detail it begs the question as to whether he really does understand Chinese. However, one could build an Al system that had two natural-language parsers (one from Chinese and one from English, both parsing into a neutral representational language, such as a semantic network) but that had only one natural-language generator (from the semantic component into English).2 This system could also have a data base (or "knowledge" base) expressed in the neutral representational language, containing the built-in datum, "I do not understand Chinese." This datum (or "belief")3 would be expressible, by hypothesis, only in English. Now, we should believe the clian-in-English of Searle-in-the-story not to understand Chinese if and only if we believed that only the English parser works; but we need not believe this claim, if we believe that both parsers do work (and that the datum is simply a false belief). Since, by hypothesis, both parsers do work, then there is just as much understanding here as there would be in the following modification of the Chinese room:
Suppose that there is a Chinese parser with an English generator, so 2Such a system can easily be built using techniques described in In other words, the (so-to-speak) "external" semantics is either a link to the outside world-which cannot be put into a program any more than it can be put into a human mind-or else it is a link to internal representations of external objects, in which case it can be made part of a program. But such semantic links are really just more syntactic symbol pushing. So even if Searle's program as is is insufficient for understanding, a mere program that could do more could understand.
5. Causation and Realization. Finally, let me mention briefly what I take to be the crucial issue in Searle's argument; namely, to use Cole's phrase, "the very form of materialism which Searle" embraces (Cole 1984, p. 432) . It is at once a narrow form and a wide form: It is narrow in that minds are not only material, but a particular kind of material; yet it is wide in that Searle accepts part of the functionalists' claim that mental phenomena are algorithmic, insisting only that the algorithm will only exhibit intentionality when running in the right kind of material; namely, one having the requisite causal powers to produce intentionality (Searle 1980 , p. 422) . Now, what are these powers? Searle does not tell us in "Minds, Brains, and Programs," but he does elaborate on it in his book, Intentionality (1983, chap. 10), introducing the notions of phenomena being "caused by" and being "realized in" some medium. These notions demand careful analysis. Here, I shall only briefly-and programmatically-state that the relationships between these notions (intimately related to those between abstract data types and their implementations) are more subtle than Searle imagines and that a computer program for simulating human intentionality that is "realized in" some implementing device can thereby give that device the requisite "causal powers" to produce intentionality. And so, as Richard Sharvy (1983) [W]hatever purely formal principles you put into the computer, they will not be sufficient for understanding, since a human will be able to follow the formal principles without understanding anything (Searle 1980, pp. 417-18).
